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Abstract

Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes the
moral domain is distinctive is its foundations in the emotions, beliefs, and response tendencies
that define indignation. The intuitive system of cognition, System I, is typically responsible for
indignation; the more reflective system, System II, may or may not provide an override. Moral
dumbfounding and moral numbness are often a product of moral intuitions that people are
unable to justify. An understanding of indignation helps to explain the operation of the many
phenomena of interest to law and politics: the outrage heuristic, the centrality of harm, the role of
reference states, moral framing, and the act-omission distinction. Because of the operation of
indignation, it is extremely difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions.
Legal and political institutions usually aspire to be deliberative, and to pay close attention to
System II; but even in deliberative institutions, System I can make some compelling demands.

There have been profound changes in the psychological analysis of moral
sentiments over the last few decades, from a conception of morality as a system of
abstract rules that can be understood and internalized (Kohlberg, 1969), to a view that
emphasizes moral emotions and moral intuitions that are not anchored in reasons (e.g.,
Greene, 2004; Haidt, 2001; Rozin, 1999). In this brief essay we sketch an analysis of
moral intuitions that builds on the new work, and relates it to a general approach to the
study of intuitive thought. We suppose that the same cognitive machinery generates
attitudes, judgments, beliefs and actions in moral domains and in other domains, and that
the moral domain is distinctive because it involves a special attitude: the complex of
emotion, beliefs and response tendencies that define indignation.
Rozin, Lowery and Imada (1999) suggested that there are three variants of
indignation: anger, disgust and contempt. The first two, but perhaps not the third, are
strongly associated with altruistic punishment. We are mainly concerned here with the
*
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variant of indignation that involves anger. For an example, imagine that you see a bully
beat up a weakling without any provocation. You will respond with indignation. Like
other attitudes, indignation has three related constituents:
(1) an emotion—which, confusingly, is also named indignation
(2) a set of beliefs and judgments about the reprehensible action
(3) a response tendency, to administer punishment to the guilty actor, even at some
cost to oneself (economists call this a readiness to provide altruistic punishment,
because it occurs even in the absence of any expectation of further interaction
with the target of punishment).
Like other intentional states, indignation can be explained in two quite different
ways: by referring to reasons, or to psychological causes. As you see the bully assaulting
his victim, you are likely to be aware of a reason for your emotion: the action violates an
accepted (and in your view justified) social rule that prohibits unprovoked aggression.
The categorization of the action provides a reason for indignation, a reason that the
observer expects other objective observers to endorse. Classical analyses of moral
development were much concerned with people’s ability to marshal reasons for their
judgments; the reasons were often understood as causing those judgments.
The view that has gained currency in recent years is quite different. In this view,
indignation is like a fear of spiders. One does not fear spiders because they are
dangerous—one just fears them. Because people tend to attribute their reactions to the
objects that evoke these reactions, the feared spider is perceived as a dangerous spider.
However, the perception of dangerousness is not the reason for the fear or even its cause;
both the fear and the perception are symptoms of an uncontrolled reaction to spiders.
Many people who are afraid of spiders know that their fear is objectively groundless and
lacks a reason. Haidt (2001) described the equivalent state in the moral domain as “moral
dumbfounding”: the experience of strong moral reactions for which no adequate reason
comes to mind. Indignation, we suggest, is often not caused by reasons, and people can
be dumbfounded when they are asked to explain why they are indignant. In fact some
puzzling outcomes, in both politics and law, are a product of indignation that is intense
and hard to justify (Sunstein, 2005). Moral dumbfounding find its mirror image in moral
numbness, in which people are not indignant even though they have reason to be, and
know they do.
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The two-system model of the mind
Consider the expression “17 x 24 = ?”. For the great majority of people, the
correct answer to the question will come to mind only if it is produced by a voluntary
mental activity, which involves deliberate application of a rule, requires several steps of
computation, storage and retrieval and takes a significant amount of time. For contrast
consider the word “vomit.” For the great majority of people, disgust will come to mind in
a completely involuntary process, which is produced very quickly by a process which is
itself unconscious—one is aware only of its outcome. The two examples represent
different families of cognitive processes.
The ancient idea that cognitive processes can be partitioned into two main
families—traditionally called “intuition” and “reason”—is now widely embraced under
the general label of dual-process theories (Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Sloman, 1996).
Dual-process theories come in many forms, but all distinguish cognitive operations that
are quick and associative from others that are slower, more reflective, and frequently
more calculative (Gilbert, 1999). We adopt the generic labels ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’
from Stanovich and West (2001). These terms may suggest the image of autonomous
homunculi, and there is in fact evidence that the two systems correspond to different
locations in the brain; but we do not suggest that the two systems are independent. We
use “systems” as a label for collections of processes that are distinguished by their speed,
their controllability, and the contents on which they operate (see Table 1).
Table 1. Two Cognitive Systems
System 1 (Intuitive)
Automatic
Effortless
Associative
Rapid
Opaque Process
Skilled

System 2 (Reflective)
Controlled
Effortful
Deductive
Slow
Self-Aware
Rule-Following

Although System 1 is more primitive than System 2, it is not necessarily less
capable. On the contrary, complex cognitive operations eventually migrate from System
2 to System 1 as proficiency and skill are acquired. A striking demonstration of the
4

intelligence of System 1 is the ability of chess masters to perceive the strength or
weakness of chess positions instantly. For those experts, pattern matching has replaced
effortful serial processing. Some people are widely taken to be moral experts as well, and
it should be clear that pattern matching occurs in the moral domain; indignation is often a
result.
In the particular dual-process model that we assume, System 1 quickly proposes
intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and System 2 monitors the quality
of these proposals, which it may endorse, correct, or override. The judgments that are
eventually expressed are called ‘intuitive’ if they retain the hypothesized initial proposal
without much modification. The roles of the two systems in determining stated judgments
depend on features of the task and of the individual, including the time available for
deliberation (Finucane et al., 2000), the respondent’s mood (Isen, Nygren & Ashby,
1988; Bless et al.,1996), and intelligence (Stanovich & West, 2001). Without time for
deliberation, for example, indignation can be extremely intense; when people have time
to reflect, their reaction diminishes. And when System 1 is not indignant, and people are
morally numb, deliberation can heighten moral concern and sometimes produce
indignation (though this can take a great deal of heavy lifting on the part of System 2).
We assume that System 1 and System 2 can be concurrently active, that automatic and
controlled cognitive operations compete for the control of overt responses, and that
deliberate judgments are likely to remain anchored on initial impressions. Our views in
these regards are similar to other dual-process models (Epstein, 1994; Gilbert, 1989,
2002; Hammond, 1996; Sloman, 1996).
The properties listed in Table 1 are shared by the system that produces intuitive
thoughts and by the perceptual system. Intuitive judgments appear to occupy a position—
perhaps corresponding to evolutionary history—between the automatic operations of
perception and the deliberate operations of reasoning. Unlike perception, however, the
operations of System 1 are not restricted to the processing of current stimulation. Like
System 2, the operations of System 1 deal with stored concepts as well as with precepts,
and can be evoked by language. This view of intuition suggests that the vast store of
scientific knowledge available about perceptual phenomena can be a source of useful
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hypotheses about the workings of intuition. The strategy of drawing on analogies from
perception is applied in the following section.
A defining property of intuitive thoughts is that they come to mind spontaneously,
like percepts. The technical term for the ease with which mental contents come to mind is
accessibility (E. Tory Higgins, 1996). To understand intuition, we must understand why
some thoughts are accessible and others are not.
Some attributes are more accessible than others, both in perception and in
judgment. Attributes that are routinely and automatically produced by the perceptual
system or by System 1, without intention or effort, have been called natural assessments
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). For example, experimental evidence shows that when a
perceiver is exposed to set of objects of the same general kind (e.g., a set of lines of
different size), attributes of a prototypical member of the set (e.g., the average length of
the lines) are computed effortlessly and automatically. Other attributes (e.g., the total
length of the lines) are not accessible—they can only be assessed by a deliberate and
quite laborious computation. Thus, average length is a natural assessment, but total length
is not. Kahneman and Frederick (2002) compiled a partial list of these natural
assessments. In addition to physical properties such as size, distance, and loudness, the
list includes more abstract properties such as similarity, causal propensity, surprisingness,
affective valence, and mood.
The evaluation of stimuli as good or bad is a particularly important natural
assessment. The evidence, both behavioral (John A. Bargh, 1997; Robert B. Zajonc,
1998) and neurophysiological (e.g., Joseph E. LeDoux, 2000), is consistent with the idea
that the assessment of whether objects are good (and should be approached) or bad
(should be avoided) is carried out quickly and efficiently by specialized neural circuitry.
A remarkable experiment reported by Bargh (1997) illustrates the speed of the evaluation
process, and its direct link to approach and avoidance. Participants were shown a series of
stimuli on a screen, and instructed to respond to each stimulus as soon as it appeared, by
moving a lever that blanked the screen. The stimuli were affectively charged words, some
positive (e.g., LOVE) and some aversive (e.g., VOMIT), but this feature was irrelevant to
the participant’s task. Half the participants responded by pulling the lever toward
themselves, half responded by pushing the lever away. Although the response was
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initiated within a fraction of a second, well before the meaning of the stimulus was
consciously registered, the emotional valence of the word had a substantial effect.
Participants were relatively faster in pulling a lever toward themselves (approach) for
positive words, and relatively faster pushing the lever away when the word was aversive.
The tendencies to approach or avoid were evoked by an automatic process that was not
under conscious voluntary control. Several psychologists have commented on the
influence of this primordial evaluative system (here included in System 1) on the
attitudes and preferences that people adopt consciously and deliberately (Zajonc, 1998;
Kahneman, Ritov and Schkade, 1999; Paul Slovic et al, 2002; Epstein, 2003). The
implicit attitude test, designed to measure racial and other biases, finds that people show
an automatic bias against African-Americans, older people, and others, even when they
are unaware of it and wish to be unbiased (Nosek, Banaji, and Greenwald, 2002).
To complete this sketch of the operations of System 1, we introduce a process of
attribute substitution that shapes many judgments and choices.

The concept was

introduced by Kahneman and Frederick (2002) as a basic mechanism to explain the basic
results of heuristic judgment. They proposed that the reduction of complex tasks to
simpler operations which characterizes such judgments is achieved by an operation in
which an individual assesses “a specified target attribute of a judgment object by
substituting another property of that object—the heuristic attribute—which comes more
readily to mind” (p. 53). In the moral domain, as we show later, individuals charged with
the task of determining the severity of a punishment appear to solve this difficult problem
by consulting the intensity of their outrage.
Several of the processes we have discussed are involved in the explanation of a
study reported by Miller and McFarland (1986), in which respondents determined the
appropriate compensation for a man who was shot in the arm during the robbery of a
grocery store. Some respondents were told that the robbery happened at the victim’s
regular store. Other respondents were told that the victim was shot in a store that he
visited for the first time, because his usual store happened to be closed that day. The two
versions obviously differ in poignancy, because the counterfactual ‘undoing’ of an
unusual event comes more easily to mind than the undoing of a normal occurrence. The
difference of poignancy translated into a difference of $100,000 in the median award
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judged appropriate for the two cases. The participants in this experiment apparently
answered the difficult question of appropriate question by mapping onto a scale of dollars
their answer to a simple question: how much were they emotionally touched by the story.
It is unlikely that the respondents deliberately chose to provide this large
compensation for poignancy. Indeed, when respondents were presented with both
versions of the robbery story and asked whether a compensation board should make
different awards in the two cases, 90% thought it should not. In the terms of the present
discussion, the emotion-anchored process that produced the initial awards is dominated
by System 1. The requirement to compare two questions evokes a much more complex
activity, here attributed to System 2, which identifies the distinctive element that
separates the two versions, and is unable to find any moral justification for different
awards. This can be seen as an instance of “moral dumbfounding” (Haidt, 2001), in
which a strong intuition exists that cannot be anchored in rules that the person
consciously accepts.
Outrage and Harm
We have studied the operation of moral judgments in the domain of punitive
damage awards (Kahneman, Schkade and Sunstein, 1998; Sunstein, Kahneman and
Schkade, 1998). One of our hypotheses, couched in the language of the present treatment,
was that the setting of such awards is mediated by an outrage heuristic.
Participants drawn from a jury roll in Texas were shown vignettes of legal cases
in which a plaintiff had suffered a personal injury while using a product. For example,
one of the scenarios concerned a child who had been burned when his pajamas caught
fire as he was playing with matches. The pajamas were made of fabric that was not
adequately fire-resistant, and the defendant firm had been aware of the problem. For
some of the scenarios, alternative versions were constructed that differed in the severity
of harm. In the high-harm version of the pajamas case, for example, the child was
“severely burned over a significant portion of his body and required several weeks in
hospital and months of physical therapy”. In the low-harm version “his hands and arms
were badly burned and required professional medical treatment for several weeks”.
Participants were told that the plaintiff had already been awarded compensatory damages.
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One group of respondents indicated whether punitive damages were appropriate, and if
so in what amount. Another group rated the outrageousness of the defendant’s behavior.
In a subsequent re-analysis of this study, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) also obtained
ratings of the severity of the harm suffered in each of the 14 vignettes. Lawsuits were not
mentioned in these descriptions of harm. The same basic design was replicated twice,
varying the size of the defendant firm.
The results supported the conclusion that assessments of punitive damages (the
target attribute in this study) were mediated by an outrage heuristic. In the analysis
offered by Kahneman and Frederick (2002), the outrage associated with each case was
estimated by the product of the product of the average ratings of outrageousness and of
harm. The correlations (over 14 vignettes) between the estimate of outrage and mean
punitive damages were.90 in one of the firm-size conditions and .94 in the other.
The role of actual harm as a determinant of outrage in this experiment is of
interest as a potential case of moral dumbfounding. The legally recognized distinction
between murder and attempted murder is a salient example of the issue we raise.
Consider the following scenarios:
1. A wishes B dead but does nothing about it
2. A tries to kill B and fails by chance
3. A tries to kill B and succeeds
It is difficult to justify a moral distinction between the last two cases. Indeed, it is
safe to assume that people are asked to judge the outrageousness of the actions, there will
be no difference. But punitive intent reflects the emotional intensity of the response to the
event, and the emotion evidently depends on the harm that actually occurred. In the terms
of the present analysis, the severity of punishment reflects the intensity of an emotional
reaction in System 1. Punishments that are determined in this manner are expected to be
crudely retributive, which is what we observe. Note that we are not claiming that it is
impossible to defend the distinction, drawn by the criminal law, between murder and
attempted murder. There may be good reasons for drawing that distinction. What we are
arguing is that the distinction is not caused by those reasons; it is caused by the fact that
moral intuitions, automatic and uncontrolled, are different in the two cases.

9

Indignation and the Definition of Harm
Indignation is evoked in an observer “by an agent who, intentionally and without
provocation or adequate reason, causes a victim to suffer harm.” This highly abstract
statement could be read as a rule that specifies appropriate reasons for indignation.
Instead, we take the statement as an attempt to describe the rules that govern the
elicitation of indignation in the observer’s System 1. As in many other situations, the use
of a language of reason to describe processes that reason does not govern creates
ambiguity and the risk of confusion. Indeed, every word in the statement changes its
meaning across the two contexts—and the meaning that applies to the description must
be a concept that System 1 is able to process.
An example is the notion of harm. Here again, we can offer a defining statement:
“Harm is a loss relative an entitlement. An individual’s entitlements are governed by
rules and expectations that are shared by the community.” This statement obviously
covers many different kinds of harm, from physical injury to loss of property, and also to
loss of reputation—depending on the nature of the entitlement that is violated. Here
again, the statement sounds like a rule. It also appears to lead us nowhere, because now
we must ask: what does System 1 know about entitlements? System 2 might, of course,
have a theory of one or another kind, but that theory may or may not map onto moral
intuitions. For System 1, the answer is that an entitlement is a socially endorsed normal
state, also called a reference state, relative to which losses are defined. A reference state
is an expectation that a valued stated will be maintained. A valued state is defined by the
fact that deviations from it produce positive or negative affect. Now we are making some
progress, because System 1 (and the perceptual system) are quite capable of setting up
expectations and in detecting deviations from them, and System 1 also produces
emotional responses to changes.
The intuitive notion of entitlement was explored in a study of the moral attitudes
to the behavior of firms in the market (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986). Residents
of two Canadian cities evaluated the fairness of various unilateral actions that a firm
might take to set the terms of its transactions with customers, employees or tenants. Table
2 presents examples that convey the general trends of the results, by attaching the labels
Fair and Unfair to several sets of actions. Each set may be viewed as an experiment,
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intended to isolate a critical factor in judgments of unfairness. Actions that are grouped
together were always evaluated by different respondents.

Table 2
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A1—Unfair—A hardware store raises the price of snow shovels during a spring blizzard.
A2—Fair—A store maintains the price of a good when its costs drop, thus increasing its
profits.
B1—Unfair—An employer who is doing well cuts wages by 5%, because many
unemployed workers would be willing to work at the lower rate.
B2—Fair—An employer who is doing poorly cuts wages by 5%, to avoid or diminish
losses.
C1—Fair—The worker replacing an employee who quit is paid less for doing the same
job.
C2—Fair—An employer changes his line of business (from painting to landscaping),
retains the same workers but reduces their wage.
D1—Unfair—A landlord raises the rent of a sitting tenant after learning that the tenant
has found a good job in the area and will not want to move.
D2—Fair—Facing increasing costs, a landlord raises the rent of a sitting tenant who
lives on a fixed income and may be forced to move.
E1—Unfair—A grocery store with a large stock of peanut butter raises its price
immediately when it learns that wholesale prices have risen.
E2—Fair—A landlord who rents apartments in two identical buildings charges higher
rent for one of them, because a more costly foundation was required for that building.
F1—Unfair—An employer cuts wages by 7% in a period of high unemployment and no
inflation.
F2—Fair—An employer raises wages by 5% in a period of high unemployment and 12%
inflation.
Unfair—A car dealer raises the price of a popular model above list price when a shortage
develops.
Fair—A car dealer eliminates a discount on a popular car model.
A surprisingly simple model, growing out of a conception of what counts as harm,
adequately summarizes those intuitive judgments. In this model the relations between a
firm and its transactors (customers or employees) are regulated by a reference
transaction, which specifies a reference profit for the firm and reference terms (price,
wage, rent) for the transactors. The firm has the power to impose a change of these terms
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by posting new prices or by setting new wages; it is also free to maintain the reference
terms of trade as circumstances change. Actions that abuse this power will be called
unfair.
The reference transaction specifies what the transactors “have a right to expect” in
their dealings with the firm. According to widespread moral intuitions, both sides have an
informal entitlement to the terms of that transaction. The reference terms often
correspond to the status quo. Indeed, the linking of entitlements to the reigning status quo
is a powerful mechanism that transforms is into ought. However, states other than the
status quo can be designated as the relevant reference. For example, a firm that labels a
price as discounted or a part of the worker’s income as a bonus, reserves the right to limit
its transactors’ entitlement to the ‘regular’ prices and wages.
A few critical distinctions are made. The first is between actions that the firm
takes to protect its profits from an exogenous threat and actions that it initiates to increase
its profit at someone’s expense. The principal constraint imposed by the intuitive
principles of fairness is that a firm cannot fairly achieve a gain by exploiting its power to
impose a loss on its transactors. This is the sense in which transactors have an entitlement
to the reference terms. However, the entitlement is not unconditional. The firm is also
entitled to its reference profit—the profit it achieves in the reference trasaction—and this
entitlement trumps the transactors’ entitlement. When its reference profit is threatened, it
is not unfair for a firm to protect itself by passing on losses to transactors; the rules of
fairness do not require the firm to absorb any part of an exogenously imposed loss. A
second distinction is between losses and failures to gain. The rules of fairness do not
require the firm to share with its transactors any gains that it obtains, whether by good
fortune or by its efforts. For example, a large majority of respondents in a subsequent
study believed that a firm has no obligation to pass on any reduction of wholesale prices
to its customers. Of course, a firm that shares its gains with its customers or employees
will be admired. But a firm that fails to do so will not evoke indignation.
As we might expect of judgments that arise from intuitions rather than from a
rule, the moral judgments in Table 1 are specified at a strikingly low level of abstraction,.
For example, the reference price for a can of peanut butter appears to be linked to the
price at which it was bought, rather than to the price at which it will be replaced (E2), and
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the firm’s obligation not to cut wages evidently protects only the nominal wage rather
than the workers’ real income (F1 vs. F2). The entitlement to the reference terms is also
personal: it protects the current tenant or employee, but not their replacements.
It seems safe to predict that the factors that determine the fairness of market
transactions will also prove to be critical in the broader context of social justice. In law as
well as morality, the issue of affirmative action provides an instructive example. Hardly
anyone will think it fair to achieve the goals of affirmative action by a policy in which
current employees would lose their jobs to make room for replacements that would
improve the representativeness of the work force. In fact, the Supreme Court of the
United States has vindicated this intuition, suggesting that affirmative action programs
are unacceptable when they impose losses on existing workers (Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 US 267, 1986). On the other hand, a policy that discriminates among new
hires is much more acceptable, because it appears to create only gainers and non-gainers,
but no losers. As this example illustrates, the distinction between actual losses and
opportunities foregone, however fragile after reflection, is psychologically and morally
real. Indeed, the distinction appears to be categorical: the coefficient of loss aversion is
much higher in the moral domain than in the domain of individual choice. System 2, of
course, raises serious questions about the distinction between actual losses and
opportunities foregone; but it is often silenced in the face of moral indignation.
Moral Framing
A framing effect is said to occur when two extensionally equivalent statements
evoke different judgments or preferences when presented singly, yet appear transparently
equivalent when shown together (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Framing effects arise
because statements that are extensionally equivalent may nevertheless evoke different
associations and different emotional responses: A cold cut described as 90% fat-free is
more attractive than if it is described as 10% fat, and more likely to be purchased.
Framing effects are a manifestation of the associative and emotional processes of System
1. There have been several demonstrations of framing effects in the domain of moral
judgment.
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Thomas Schelling has offered a compelling example, one that illustrates the
difficulties that may arise when outcomes are evaluated as changes relative to an arbitrary
reference level. Schelling reports asking his students to evaluate a tax policy that would
allow a larger child exemption to the rich than to the poor. Many listeners will
immediately respond as Schelling’s students do, that this proposal is outrageous. The
intuition that leads to this quick conclusion is a simple and attractive rule: no social
allocation of gains or losses should be more favorable to the rich than to the poor.
Schelling next points out to his students that the default case in the standard tax table is a
childless family, with special adjustments for families with children. Of course, the
existing tax schedule could be rewritten with a family with two children as the default
case. Childless families would then pay a surcharge. Should this surcharge be as large for
the poor as for the rich? Of course not.
Schelling’s example is a framing effect, in which an inconsequential aspect of the
statement of the problem appears to control moral judgments. The intuitions that are
evoked by formulating the problem in terms of exemptions and surcharges are
incoherent. Neither intuition survives when the inconsistency is pointed out. It soon
becomes apparent that the only formulation of the tax problem that avoids arbitrariness is
a complete table that determines the after-tax income of families for every level of pretax income and number of children. This description in terms of final states is superior,
precisely because it avoids powerful intuitions that can be manipulated by the framing of
the problem. Unfortunately, there are no clear moral intuitions left to resolve the problem
when it is properly framed. In this case as well as in others the only potent moral
intuitions apply to changes and to differences, not to states.
From money we turn to legal questions involving the valuation of injuries to
health, and to an experiment in which the same difference between two states of health
was caused to be coded either as a loss or as a gain. The experiment was concerned with
lay assessments of appropriate monetary compensation for the pain and suffering
associated with personal injuries, such as “losing mobility in one knee for four years”
(McCaffery, Kahneman and Spitzer,1994). Separate samples of respondents were given
different “jury instructions” describing the thought experiment they should conduct to
determine fair compensation. One of the instructions suggested a positive choice between
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two desirable options. The respondents were instructed to imagine that the victim had
very recently suffered the injury and was now offered a choice between a complete and
immediate cure and an amount of money. Fair compensation was to be set at the highest
amount for which the victim would still prefer the cure. In contrast, the selling instruction
required the respondent to assume that the victim considered an ex ante proposition to
accept the injury in conjunction with a payment of money. Fair compensation was to be
set at the lowest payment for which the victim would have accepted the offer.
The difference between health and injury is coded as a gain in the former case and
as a loss in the latter—this is the pattern of an endowment effect. In terms of final states,
of course, the two versions of the problem are not distinguishable. As expected, the
average judgment of fair compensation was about twice as high with the selling than with
the choice instruction. This is also a framing effect, but unlike Schelling’s example the
people who are susceptible to this effect rarely acknowledge its existence. When the
participants in each experimental condition were shown the instruction given to the other
group, they thought both instructions were fair and did not notice that they were likely to
evoke discrepant responses. The legal system typically uses a version of the buying
instruction, but without a great deal of reflective thinking about why that instruction
should be preferred; and creative lawyers are able to frame the problem so as to ensure
that a selling instruction comes before the jury, in a way that produces predictably higher
dollar awards.
Moral framing has been demonstrated in the important context of obligations to
future generations (see Frederick 2003), a much-disputed question of morality, politics,
and law (Revesz 1999). To say the least, the appropriate discount rate for those yet to be
born is not a question that most people have pondered, and hence their judgments are
highly susceptible to different frames. From a series of surveys, Maureen Cropper and
her coauthors (1994) suggest that people are indifferent between saving one life today
and saving 45 lives in 100 years. They make this suggestion on the basis of questions
asking people whether they would choose a program that saves “100 lives now” or a
program that saves a substantially larger number “100 years from now.” It is possible,
however, that people’s responses depend on uncertainty about whether people in the
future will otherwise die (perhaps technological improvements will save them?); and
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other ways of framing the same problem yield radically different results (Frederick
2003). For example, most people consider “equally bad” a single death from pollution
next year and a single death from pollution in 100 years. This finding implies no
preference for members of the current generation. The simplest conclusion is that
people’s moral intuitions about obligations to future generations are very much a product
of framing effects (for a similar result, see Baron 2000).
The same point holds for the question whether government should consider not
only the number of “lives” but also the number of “life years” saved by regulatory
interventions. If the government focuses on life-years, a program that saves children will
be worth far more attention that a similar program that saves senior citizens. Is this
immoral? People’s intuitions depend on how the question is framed (see Sunstein 2004).
People will predictably reject an approach that would count every old person as “worth
less” than what every young person is worth. But if people are asked whether they would
favor a policy that saves 105 old people or 100 young people, many will favor the latter,
in a way that suggests a willingness to pay considerable attention to the number of lifeyears at stake.
Framing effects present a large difficulty for the achievement of coherent
judgments and preferences. The normal process of comprehension takes a given message
to a state of the world, but the correspondence of messages and states is not one-to-one.
Ambiguity arises when a single message is compatible with multiple states of the world.
Framing effects arise when a single state of the world may be described in multiple ways,
and when a relevant response is description-dependent. Thus, the avoidance of framing
effects requires a search through the set of descriptions that are extensionally equivalent
to the original message. Unfortunately, the human mind is not equipped to solve this
problem. People are therefore given no warning, when confronted with a particular
version of Schelling’s tax puzzle that there is an alternative version of the same problem
to which they would have responded differently. In the context of punitive damage
awards and valuation of environmental amenities, we have found that incoherence in
moral judgments is predictable (Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade, and Ritov, 2003). We
leave to others the possible implications of these observations for the notion of reflective
equilibrium.
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Agency, Omission and Brutal Commission
To say the least, there has been much discussion of whether and why the
distinction between acts and omissions might matter for morality, law, and policy. In one
case, for example, a patient might ask a doctor not to provide life-sustaining equipment,
thus ensuring the patient’s death. In another case, a patient might ask a doctor to inject a
substance that will immediately end the patient’s life. Many people seem to have a strong
moral intuition that the failure to provide life-sustaining equipment, and even the
withdrawal of such equipment, is acceptable and legitimate—but that the injection is
morally abhorrent. And indeed American constitutional law reflects judgments to exactly
this effect: People have a constitutional right to withdraw equipment that is necessary to
keep them alive, but they have no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide (see
Washington v. Glucksberg 1997, pp. 724–25). But what is the morally relevant
difference?
It is worth considering the possibility that the act-omission distinction is rooted in
System I, and is in some cases very hard to defend in principle. The moral puzzles arise
when life, or a clever interlocutor, comes up with a case in which there is no morally
relevant distinction between acts and omissions, but when moral intuitions strongly
suggest that there must be such a difference. As an example, consider the vaccination
question; many people show an omission bias, favoring inaction over statistically
preferable action (Baron and Ritov 1993). The persistent acceptance of withdrawal of
life-saving equipment, alongside persistent doubts about euthanasia, may be another
demonstration of the point.
Compare the dispute over two well-known problems in moral philosophy (see
Thomson 1986, pp. 94–116). These problems do not involve the act-omission distinction;
no omission is involved. But the problems implicate closely related concerns. The first,
called the trolley problem, asks people to suppose that a runaway trolley is headed for
five people, who will be killed if the trolley continues on its current course. The question
is whether you would throw a switch that would move the trolley onto another set of
tracks, killing one person rather than five. Most people would throw the switch. The
second, called the footbridge problem, is the same as that just given, but with one
difference: the only way to save the five is to throw a stranger, now on a footbridge that
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spans the tracks, into the path of the trolley, killing that stranger but preventing the trolley
from reaching the others. Most people will not kill the stranger; in fact they are indignant
at the suggestion that they ought to do so. But what is the difference between the two
cases, if any? A great deal of philosophical work has been done on this question, much of
it trying to suggest that our firm intuitions can indeed be defended in principle.
Without engaging these arguments, let us suggest the possibility of a simpler
answer. As a matter of principle, there may or may not be a difference between the two
cases. But people’s different reactions are based on automatic moral intuitions that
condemn the throwing of the stranger but support the throwing of the switch. As a matter
of intuition, it is worse to throw a human being in the path of a trolley than to throw a
switch that (indirectly?) leads to a death. People also struggle heroically, and by reference
to System 2, to rescue their intuitions and to establish that the two cases are genuinely
different in principle. whether or not this is so, But system 1, and indignation about brutal
acts of commission, are responsible for the underlying intuitions.
Consider a suggestive experiment designed to see how the human brain responds
to the two problems (Greene et al. 2001). The authors do not attempt to answer the moral
questions in principle, but they find “that there are systematic variations in the
engagement of emotions in moral judgment,” and that brain areas associated with
emotion are far more active in contemplating the footbridge problem than in
contemplating the trolley problem. An implication of the authors’ finding is that human
brains are hard-wired to distinguish between bringing about a death “up close and
personal” and doing so at a distance. It follows that acts, especially brutal acts, would be
far more likely to produce reactions from the brain areas associated with emotions than
omissions that cause identical harms. Compare the case of fear, where an identifiable
region of the brain makes helpfully immediate but not entirely reliable judgments
(Ledoux 1998), in a way that suggests a possible physical location for some of the
operations of System I. So too, we think, in the context of morality, politics, and law
(Greene & Haidt 2002). A clear implication involves moral numbness: Many omissions
do not trigger indignation on the part of System 1, but might well be subject to moral
criticism from the standpoint of System 2, if only it can become sufficiently active.
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Conclusion
Moral intuitions operate in much the same way as other intuitions do; what makes
the moral domain is distinctive is its foundations in the emotions, beliefs, and response
tendencies that define indignation. System 1 is typically responsible for indignation;
System II may or may not provide an override. Moral dumbfounding and moral
numbness are often a product of moral intuitions that people are unable to justify. We
have argued that an understanding of indignation helps to explain the operation of the
outrage heuristic, the centrality of harm, the role of reference states, moral framing, and
the act-omission distinction. We have also suggested that because of how indignation
operates, it is extremely difficult for people to achieve coherence in their moral intuitions.
The intuitions described here play an important role in multiple domains,
including families, workplaces, sporting events, and religious organizations. But as many
of our examples suggest, they also influence the decisions of legal and political
institutions. Such institutions usually aspire to be deliberative, and to pay close attention
to System II; but even in deliberative institutions, System I can make some compelling
demands.
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